# Yet Another Bazar Loader DGA

- January 23, 2021
- reverse engineering
- dga malware analysis
- no comments

#### Disclaimer

These are just unpolished notes. The content likely lacks clarity and structure; and the results might not be adequately verified and/or incomplete.

#### Changes

- 2021-03-23 21:24:10: second seed and details for the IP transformation

#### Aliases

The malware in this blog post is known as BazarBackdoor, Team9Backdoor, BazDor, BazarLoader and BazaLoader

#### Malpedia

For more information about the malware in this blog post see the Malpedia entry on BazarBackdoor.

#### URLhaus

This page lists malware URLs that are tagged with BazarLoader.

#### MalwareBazaar

You can download bazaloader samples from this page.

#### Cover Image

Cover Photo by Naim Benjelloun on Pexels#### Related Posts

This is one of five blog posts on "Bazar Loader". Check out the other parts here:Bazar Loader decided to change its perfectly fine domain generation algorithm (DGA) once again. The change in the algorithm is very minor, but it yields more domain names.

### Sample

I looked at this sample:

- MD5
- 9ad20d0e6da3cf135a93bf162a0a8cfb
- SHA1
- a97893ab95f794cabc261483423f942f552926d0
- SHA256
- 8e244f1a5b4653d6dbb4cc3978c7dd773b227a443361fbc30265b79f102f7eed
- Size
- 288 KB (295616 Bytes)
- Compile Timestamp
- 2021-01-20 19:37:37 UTC
- Links
- MalwareBazaar, Malpedia, Dropping_sha256, Cape, VirusTotal
- Filenames
- Preview_report20-01.exe (VirusTotal)
- Detections
**MalwareBazaar**: BazaLoader,**Virustotal**: 33/76 as of 2021-01-23 07:31:37 - Trojan.Win32.Zenpak.4!c (AegisLab), Backdoor:Win32/KZip.90c5e0b2 (Alibaba), BackDoor.Bazar.55 (DrWeb), Trojan.Win32.Zenpak.bfcu (Kaspersky), Trojan:Win64/Bazarldr.BMB!MSR (Microsoft), Trojan.Win32.Zenpak.bfcu (ZoneAlarm)

it unpacks to this

- MD5
- 63784053ac2f608d94c18b17c46ab5d4
- SHA1
- e01c814d6a4993c74a2bfb87b1b661fe78c41291
- SHA256
- c0a087a520fdfb5f1e235618b3a5101969c1de85b498bc4670372c02756efd55
- Size
- 98 KB (100864 Bytes)
- Compile Timestamp
- 2021-01-20 19:10:11 UTC
- Links
- MalwareBazaar, Malpedia, Dropping_sha256, Dropping_sha256, Cape, VirusTotal
- Filenames
*none*- Detections
**MalwareBazaar**: BazaLoader,**Virustotal**: 21/75 as of 2021-01-23 13:37:55 - Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (ALYac), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (Ad-Aware), Trojan.Bulz.D27EC5 (Arcabit), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (BitDefender), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (B) (Emsisoft), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (GData), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (MicroWorld-eScan), Trojan:Win32/TrickBot.VSF!MTB (Microsoft), Trojan.TrickBot!8.E313 (TFE:5:6iToUtBEDBC) (Rising)

which finally drops

- MD5
- 7e8eddaef14aa8de2369d1ca6347b06d
- SHA1
- 4543e6da0515bb7d93e930c9f30e40912d495373
- SHA256
- f29253139dab900b763ef436931213387dc92e860b9d3abb7dcd46040ac28a0e
- Size
- 89 KB (91136 Bytes)
- Compile Timestamp
- 2021-01-18 14:29:29 UTC
- Links
- MalwareBazaar, Malpedia, Dropped_by_sha256, Cape, VirusTotal
- Filenames
*none*- Detections
**MalwareBazaar**: None,**Virustotal**: 19/76 as of 2021-01-23 15:04:35 - Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (ALYac), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (Ad-Aware), Trojan.Win32.Bulz.4!c (AegisLab), Trojan.Bulz.D27EC5 (Arcabit), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (BitDefender), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (B) (Emsisoft), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (FireEye), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (GData), Gen:Variant.Bulz.163525 (MicroWorld-eScan)

### Difference from the Last Version

The current version is just a slight modification to the version from December. Like the previous version of the algorithm, this version calculates all ordered pairs of 19 consonants and 6 vowels (including *y* ). These pairs are then permuted based on a fixed value. This value is the same, so the resulting list of 228 pairs is also the same.

The calculation of the first four letters is the same – that is, the selection of the first two pairs of letters: The permuted list of letters is divided into groups of 19 pairs. Then the two digits of the current month determine which group is selected. From these, one pair at a time is randomly – and unpredictably – selected.

The last four letters (two pairs) are still determined by the two year digits. However, the division of letter pairs into groups is different. Based on the current decade, two letters are chosen from a group of 22 pairs. The groups of 22 pairs partly overlap, so that theoretically after every 10 years identical domains could be generated again. This in contrast to the version from December, where the decade still determined a non-overlapping group of 6 pairs only. The last two letters are picked from groups of 4 — instead of 6 — letter pairs.

The DGA still generates 10'000 domains. But because there are 88 potential monthly combinations for the last for letters instead of just 36 previously, the excepted number of unique domains is larger:

$$ \mathbb{E} = 31768 \left( 1 - \left(\frac{31768 -1}{31768 }\right)^{10000} \right) \approx 8579 $$

Since domain names partially repeat after each decade, domains can no longer be uniquely assigned to a seed. But since I strongly doubt that the domain generation algorithm will still have any relevance in a few months, let alone 10 years, the domain to seed tool assumes domains are from the 20s.

### IP Transformation

The A record of the domains is encrypted, just as in previous versions. Meaning, the four bytes of the IP are XORed with `0xFE`

. The IP is then used in URLs of format `https://{ip}:443`

. For example, if the domain `omleekyw.bazar`

has an A record of `220.39.239.27`

, then the actual contacted URL is `https://34.217.17.229:443`

.

### Reimplementation in Python

This is the new version reimplemented in Python

```
from itertools import product
from datetime import datetime
import argparse
from collections import namedtuple
Param = namedtuple('Param', 'mul mod idx')
pool = (
"qeewcaacywemomedekwyuhidontoibeludsocuexvuuftyliaqydhuizuctuiqow"
"agypetehfubitiaziceblaogolryykosuptaymodisahfiybyxcoleafkudarapu"
"qoawyluxqagenanyoxcygyqugiutlyvegahepovyigqyqibaeqynyfkiobpeepby"
"xaciyvusocaripfyoftesaysozureginalifkazaadytwuubzuvoothymivazyyz"
"hoevmeburedeviihiravygkemywaerdonoyryqloammoseweesuvfopiriboikuz"
"orruzemuulimyhceukoqiwfexuefgoycwiokitnuneroxepyanbekyixxiuqsias"
"xoapaxmaohezwoildifaluzihipanizoecxyopguakdudyovhaumunuwsusyenko"
"atugabiv"
)
def dga(date):
seed = date.strftime("%m%Y")
params = [
Param(19, 19, 0),
Param(19, 19, 1),
Param(4, 22, 4),
Param(4, 4, 5)
]
ranges = []
for p in params:
s = int(seed[p.idx])
lower = p.mul*s
upper = lower + p.mod
ranges.append(list(range(lower, upper)))
for indices in product(*ranges):
domain = ""
for index in indices:
domain += pool[index*2:index*2 + 2]
domain += ".bazar"
yield domain
if __name__ == "__main__":
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument(
"-d", "--date", help="date used for seeding, e.g., 2020-06-28",
default=datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d'))
args = parser.parse_args()
d = datetime.strptime(args.date, "%Y-%m-%d")
for domain in dga(d):
print(domain)
```

**Edit 23 March, 2021**: There is also a version with a different character pool, but otherwise same algorithm (see my GitHub repo for the full code).

```
pool = (
"yzewevmeywreomviekwyavygontowaerudsoyr"
"exvuamtyseweesuvizpituiqowuzoretzemuul"
"tiazicukoqiwolxuykosupwiymitisneroxeyx"
"anlekyixxirasiasxoapuxqaohezwooxdigyqu"
"ziutpavezohexyvyguqyqidyovynumunuwsusy"
"enxaatyvusivaripfyoftesaysozureginalif"
)
```

### Characteristics

Except for the number of domains per month, the characteristics are the same as for the previous verion:

property | value |
---|---|

type | TDD (time-dependent-deterministic) |

generation scheme | arithmetic |

seed | current date |

domain change frequency | every month |

unique domains per month | 19·19·22·4 = 31'768 |

sequence | random selection, might pick domains multiple times |

wait time between domains | 10 seconds |

top level domain | `.bazar` |

second level characters | a-z, without j |

regex | `[a-ik-z]{8}\.bazar` |

second level domain length | 8 |